In English law, causing criminal damage was initially a violation of common law. The violations mostly relate to the protection of shelter and food supply, and some sanctions are imposed to damage private property. Liability was initially limited to compensation payments.
As time passes, special laws are introduced to deal with certain situations when they are judged to require intervention, especially along with the emergence of mechanization and urbanization during the Industrial Revolution.
Modern law of criminal damage is largely contained in the Criminal Damage Act of 1971, which alters or creates several violations that protect property rights. The law provides a comprehensive structure that includes only preparatory actions for the most serious violations of arson and causes damage with the intention of endangering lives. Thus, the punishment varies from a permanent sentence to life imprisonment, and the court may order payment of compensation to the victim.
Video Criminal damage in English law
History
General law
Common law generally treats the damage of other people's goods as a civil matter which only causes the right to damage due to a violation or disturbance; in the 18th century, Blackstone declared: "Private property in possession is responsible for two types of injury: amosi [carrying away] or seizure of possession, and the misuse or destruction of goods, while ownership continues in the rightful owner." Blackstone clearly refer to this as "Private Wrongs" in his comments, stressing that property rights are applied to inter partes, and that the State should not be one of the parties involved. In fact, criminal law only intervenes in the case of arson, defines it as "the evil and deliberate combustion of a house or someone else's hut". This protection is extended to a barn and even a "corn pile". Arson traditionally drew the death penalty, and had done so in Roman law.
Initial law
While the common law protects shelter and the source of wealth and food in a largely agricultural society, the Industrial Revolution, especially Luddism resulting from the perceived threats of workers to their livelihoods, requires new laws to adjust the circumstances. The Parliament's reaction to Luddism was to criminalize the machine breaker - the destruction of a textile machinery machine - early in 1721. Initially the sentence was transportation to the Colonies but as a result of the continuing opposition to the mechanization of the Framing Act of Frame in 1812 capital punishment available.
Consolidation
A number of legal provisions that create violations undermine certain types of property consolidated by 7 & amp; 8 Geo.4 c.30 (1827) (Hazardous injury to property) which is one of Peel's Acts. This law and subsequent laws are consolidated by the Damage Dangerous Law of 1861.
Maps Criminal damage in English law
Dangerous Damage Act 1861
The Dangerous Damage Act 1861 is a Victorian consolidation law which provides for detailed protection of property, most of which has now been superseded by the Criminal Degradation Act of 1971. Other provisions in force in England and Wales are:
- Section 35 - Placing wood, & amp; c. on a railroad, with the intention of blocking or overthrowing any machine, & amp; c.
- Section 36 - Confront the engine or carriage on the railroad
- Section 58 - Malice against unnecessary property owners
- Section 72 - Violations committed within the Admiralty jurisdiction
Criminal Damage Act 1971
Definition
Whereas the 1861 Act is protected in detail various types of property, the 1971 Criminal Damage Act provides a broad enough definition to apply to any tangible property. With part 1 (1) of the Act:
A person who for no legitimate reason destroys or destroys any property belonging to another person who intends to destroy or damage such property or becomes reckless, whether such property will be destroyed or damaged will be guilty of a violation.
"No legitimate reason"
Regardless of the general defense reasons applicable to any violations involving acts of violence, section 5 of the Act sets out specific provisions in relation to criminal damages: the defendant will have "valid reasons" if
- (a) at the time... he believed that the person... was believed to be entitled to consent to the destruction or damage... had either agreed, or would have agreed if they knew.., or
- (b) he destroys or destroys... the property in question... to protect property... and at that moment... he believes--
- (i) that property... immediately requires protection; and
- (ii) that the means of protection... is... makes sense by paying attention to all circumstances.
Section 5 (3) of the Act states that it is not material whether the defendant's conviction is justified as long as it is an honest belief, and therefore creates a subjective test to be judged by a court or jury. In Chamberlain v. Lindon (1998), Lindon undermines the wall to protect the street rights, honestly believing that it is a sensible way to avoid litigation. It is said that:
In the criminal context the question is not whether the means of protection adopted by the respondent objectively make sense, taking into account all circumstances, but whether the respondent believes them to be so, and under section 5 (3) it is immaterial whether his beliefs are justified, provided they are held honestly.
However, in Rv. Hill and Hall (1989), the Court of Appeal introduced an objective element for part (b) of defense. The defendants have been convicted of having a hacksaw blade outside a US naval base in Wales, after admitting intent to use a knife to cut the perimeter fence of the base. They claim legitimate reasons because they have acted to protect their own property located near the base; their reason was that the base would at some point in the future pull the nuclear strike by the Soviet Union. Given that Hill "is forced to admit that he does not expect a nuclear bomb to fall today or tomorrow", the Court concludes that the threat to this property is too far and thus a defense has not been made, but honestly the belief has.
Case Jaggard v. Dickinson (1980) states that even a drunken conviction will support defense even though this allows drunkenness to negate the basic intent; and Lloyd v. DPP (1992) decides that a motorist who damages the wheel clamp to free his car, after parking on another property knows the risk of being clamped, has no valid reason under Act even if he makes a legal mistake.
The Court has said that the defendant relies on valid reasons as a defense need not attempt to place himself in section 5. In R v. Denton (1981), the defendant has been asked by his superiors to burn the employers' factory to facilitate insurance claims. Nevertheless, it is held that the factory owner has the right to have it burned - as the Chief Justice said, "[i] t is not a violation for a man to ignite his own property..." and therefore Denton, knowing this, has a legitimate reason independent of section 5.
"Damaging or destructive"
Whether damage or damage has occurred is a matter of fact and degree in each case and case law indicates that the damage must be more than de minimis . In A (teenager) v. R (1978), the defendant spat on a police officer's raincoat, which was easy to clean; held that this did not inflict damage in the 1971 Act. Similarly, in Morphitis v. Salmon (1990), scratches to scaffolding masts do not affect their value or usefulness and thus damage has not been proven. The court said:
The authorities indicate that the term "damage" for the purposes of this provision shall be broadly interpreted so as to not only infer permanent or temporary physical damage, but also permanent or temporary loss or usefulness.
Different conclusions are reached at Hardman v. Chief of Police Avon and Somerset Constabulary (1986), where graffiti, although eventually released by precipitation, is actually drifted by local authorities, incurring costs, considered criminal damage.
Suffice it to be temporary: in Cox v. Riley (1986), the removal of the program from a computer-controlled machine, making it unusable, is considered a malfunction. This decision is followed in R v. Whiteley (1991) in relation to computer hacking, although the behavior is now handled under the Computer Abuse Act of 1990. In that it says that:
Any change in the physical properties of the property concerned may cause damage in the sense of that part. Whether or not it will depend on the effect that has changed on the legitimate carrier (which for convenience can be called the owner)... where... interference... the amount of damage the value or usefulness of [property] to the owner, the damage the required set.
In R v. Fiak (2005), the defendant used a clean blanket to block the toilet of the police cell he occupied, causing water to overflow and flooding his cells and other cells. The defense argued that clean water had flooded the waterproof floor, and in the process the blanket was moistened with clean water. The covers will be reusable when dry. Cleaning the wet cell floor is not a defect in the cell itself. The Court of Appeal noted that this argument assumes no possibility of contamination or infection from the restroom itself, and states that while it is true that the effect of the applicant's actions associated with the duvet and cell can both be improved, the simple fact is that the blanket can not be used as a blanket by other prisoners to dry and cleaned. Further, the flooded cells remain unreacted until the water is clean. Thus, both are damaged, albeit temporarily.
"Property"
The definition of property in the 1971 Act is slightly different from the 1968 Theft Act because it only covers "tangible property". The soil may be damaged, as in Henderson and Batley (1984), where the defendants have disposed of the debris at a construction site that cost a great deal of money to clean up; held that this is a damage to the ground.
"Other belongs"
Section 10 (2) of the Act provides that property shall be deemed as belonging to another person -
- (a) have custody or control over it;
- (b) has exclusive rights or interests (not being a fair interest arising only from agreements to transfer or provide interest); or
- (c) has a charge on it.
These provisions are similar to those set forth in section 5 of the 1968 Theft Act in relation to theft. This is clearly a property ownership right to deal with property as a wish, including damage or destruction. However a person who burns his own mortgage-infested house may be charged because the mortgaged person will have property rights or interests in the property. The abandoned property has no owner, and can not be stolen; Therefore, such property can not be charged for criminal damage.
Intent and carelessness
The mens rea of all violations in the Act is either direct or oblique intent, or subjective carelessness as defined by House of Lords in R v. G (2003). Bingham L.J. states that a person acts "reckless" with respect to
- (i) a situation when it is aware of the risk that it exists or will exist; or
- (ii) results when it is aware of the risks that will occur;
and that, under familiar circumstances, makes no sense to take risks. In Booth v. Crown Prosecution Service (2006), the Divisional Court upheld the conviction of a pedestrian defendant on the charge that, in a hurry to run into the street, he carelessly damaged the vehicle that crashed into him because "the applicant was aware of the risks and closed his mind to it". Increased crime damage
Section 1 (2) of the Act creates an offense that includes all elements of section 1 (1) of violations with additional elements that intend or become reckless for endangering lives. This violation lies in the possible effects of the defendant's actions and therefore there is no need to prove a real danger to life. However, there must be a connection between damage and mental state of the defendant. In R v. Steer (1986), the defendant fired a weapon intending to injure another person, but missed and crashed into the window instead; it was held that despite the intention to endanger life and the fact of damage coexist, the damage itself does not endanger life. This approach is extended in R v. Webster (1995), where the relationship between the damage caused and the intended damage has been explored. The case involves throwing heavy items into a moving vehicle lane, and there is the assumption that a defendant may be guilty if he intends to endanger his life with the actual damage alleged, or reckless that life will be threatened by the damage. Therefore, although the defendant does not always intend to endanger life when he intends to break the windows of the car, ignoring the possible risk that this will cause the driver to turn into another vehicle lane, possibly fatal, is careless and a sufficient cause of nexus.
Efforts
Evidence of specific intent to endanger life is not required on the charge of committing this offense. In References of Attorney General No. Law No. 3 of 1992 (1994), on charges of aggravated combustion experiments, is sufficient for prosecutors to set specific intentions for causing fire damage and that defendants are determined whether life will be threatened. Arson
Section 1 (3) of the Act of 1971 provides that violations under section 1, in which destruction or damage caused by fire, shall be charged as arson. It appears that the court adopted a purposeful view in relation to the defense of legal reasons in relation to arson, as in Rv. Hunt (1977). The defendant, who wants to highlight the lack of fire defense in a parent's house, burns it to show the risk. He claims an honest belief that by doing this, he has legitimate reasons according to the law in section 5 (2). However, it was held that he did not actually act to protect the property. Although the court assumed that his beliefs were honest, he decided that his intention was to draw attention to damaged fire defenses rather than defend the property itself.
Threat
Section 2 states that a person threatens another person, with the intention that the other party is afraid of a threat will be done
- (a) to destroy or damage property belonging to another person or third person; or
- (b) to destroy or destroy his own property in a manner which he knows tends to endanger the lives of others or third persons;
will be guilty of an offense.
Ownership of goods
Section 3 states that a person who owns something in his custody or under his control intends without any valid reason to use it or cause or permit others to use it
- (a) to destroy or damage another's property; or
- (b) to destroy or damage the property or the user in a way that he or she knew might endanger the lives of others;
will be guilty of an offense.
For mens rea for violations under section 3 (a), see Rv Buckingham, 63 Cr App R 159, CA.
Extensive, penalties and procedures
The 1971 Act applies in England and Wales, as well as to Northern Ireland by Criminal Damage (Northern Ireland) of the 1977 Order.
Some minor types of damage, such as graffiti, can be dealt with the issue of permanent penalty notification as an alternative to prosecution.
Unresolved violations involving damages worth less than Ã, Â £ 5,000 can only be obtained briefly by a judge and the maximum penalty is a three-month jail and a fine of Ã, Â £ 2,500. If the value of damaged property exceeds Ã, Â £ 5,000, the defendant is entitled to claim a lawsuit on charges by the jury, but if tried briefly, it can be sentenced to six months in prison and a fine of Ã, Â £ 5,000. If the value of the property is unclear, the court may hear statements to assess, but may also offer a summary trial option to the defendant, with limited penalties.
Section 4 of the 1971 Act stipulates that violations under 1 (2) and 1 (3) may be punished with maximum life sentence and all others with a maximum sentence of ten years in prison. Section 30 of the 1998 Criminal and Discipline Act provides a higher 14-year jail term for racial or religious violations that are aggravated in addition to those already serving a life sentence.
The court is empowered by sections 130 to 133 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 to order compensation payments by a convicted defendant. The limit is Ã, Â £ 5,000 per violation in the trial court; the power of the Crown Court is unlimited.
The Criminal Damage Act of 1971 revoked Dockyards, etc. Protection Act 1772, which created a capital offense commonly known collectively as "burning in the royal shipyard"; this has been ignored when the death penalty for murder was abolished in 1965.
See also
- Property damage
- Mischief
Note
Further reading
- "Crime Damage: Legal Guide: The Crown Prosecution Service". Crown Prosecution Service . Retrieved 2009-04-21 .
- Heaton, Russell (2001), Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (PDF) (2nd edition) 3.), London: Blackstone Press, ISBN, 1-84174-272-4, archived from the original (PDF) in 2008-09-12 .
- An CoimisiÃÆ'nn um AthchÃÆ'³iriÃÆ'º an DlÃÆ' [Irish Law Reform Commission] (1988), Dangerous Damage Report [LRC 26-1988] , Dublin: The Law Reform Commission, filed from the original on February 7, 2008 .
Source of the article : Wikipedia
0 Comments